Introduction
We knew full well that the media were short-changing us when it came to representing 'our' side of the story, but what was our side of the story? We couldn't even explain it properly ourselves. And it's still the same. There's plenty of times people around here have refused to take part in crosscommunity meetings, not because we don't want to sit down with Catholics, but because we don't have the self-confidence to do so. Few of us can articulate our case they way they can theirs.
1 Northern Ireland's loyalists frequently lament what they perceive as their misrepresentation in the media, and in doing so they join the chorus of marginalised and oppressed sections in society that complain of being caricatured or ignored by the press, broadcasters and filmmakers. As Stuart Hall has pointed out with regards cultural representation generally, some people are always in a position to define, to set the agenda, to establish the terms of the conversation. Some others [are] … always on the margin, always responding to a question whose terms and conditions have been defined elsewhere: never 'centred ' (1995: 5) Whether loyalism can count itself among the beleaguered and marginalised is a moot point given its historic association with Britain's imperial mission and its former relatively privileged position in Ireland. But certainly in recent times loyalism's predominantly working class composition and cultural complexion have come into sharper focus as any privileges it enjoyed have been eroded. The industries that once provided employment to the Protestant working class have largely disappeared, while the state to which that community gave its allegiance is disintegrating. Stormont, of course, was prorogued in 1972 but now the United Kingdom, more broadly, is undergoing a radical transformation with the contraction of the welfare state and the gradual break-up of Britain.
While loyalism has been vociferous in its defence of Northern Ireland's place within the UK it has been relatively silent on the broader economic challenges and political context that face it. Most recently it has made its stand on questions of cultural expression and identity, where it has been confronted by its old antagonist, Irish republicanism, over the display of the union flag and parade routes. However loyalism also faces a more insidious challenge in the determination of Northern Ireland's political and economic leaders to establish the region as a fully signed up member of the global free-market. Loyalism's stout allegiances and noisy public manifestations make it anathema in this new dispensation, where the preferred form of cultural expression is that of individual, consumer lifestyle choices. It is within this context of cultural estrangement, economic impoverishment and political homelessness, that loyalism's dreadful media image and reputation is perhaps best understood.
In this chapter I want to consider film as a means by which to understand loyalism's alienation from the good opinion of others. But I want to argue that film also has the potential to offer a means by which working class Protestants can begin to articulate alternatives to their derogatory representation. This requires a critical cultural practice that demonstrates an understanding of film form and history; an appreciation of the social context in which the practice is formed; and a willingness to see cultural practice as an aid to social transformation and not merely a means by which to achieve 'affirmative' cultural representations, which can be anodyne and trivialising.
In any case audiences will have seen few affirmative representations of loyalism on film. More typically it is captured in the image of a gunman, as a monstrous outsider in cinematic Ireland, or alternatively viewed through the lens of generic conventions -horror and gangster films -where it provides an image of delinquent masculinity to trouble and thrill contemporary cinema audiences. Seldom is loyalism presented in any historical or social context that would help illuminate its politics or its actions; nor is it afforded any sense of political idealism, and as a consequence it is reduced to a form of psychopathology.
Of course loyalism is not alone in suffering such treatment on-screen. Republicans, while occasionally allowed a degree of political romanticism, have also had their fair share of mad, bad and dangerous gunmen. Indeed as John Hill has pointed out, there is a historic tendency in cinema to portray the conflict in Ireland as a consequence of an inherent flaw in the national character that dooms its combatants to a violent and tragic fate (1987: 147) . These representations of Ireland as 'dark and strife-torn maelstrom', and a site of primordial violence are mostly found in British films, so providing an ideological alibi for Britain's history of military and political involvement in Ireland. If the Irish can be presented as predisposed to violence then Britain appears to stand above the conflict, intervening only as a civilising influence. North American cinema, on the other hand, has provided the other dominant image of Ireland as a 'generally blissful, rural idyll' (Ibid), playing to the fond remembrances of the large immigrant Irish population that make up a significant section of its domestic audience. John Hill argues that even early indigenous film production in Northern Ireland tended to pander to the expectations of North American audiences, producing romanticised images that pleased the local tourist industry but failed to satisfy unionism's aspiration for a distinctive 'Ulster' character, differentiating the North from the South of Ireland. More particularly, visions of 'nostalgic pastoralism' (Hill, 1987: 147) It is precisely the cultural relationship between landscape and people that Brian
Graham draws attention to in his discussion about the crisis in Protestant identity.
He argues that Ulster Protestants in general, and unionists in particular, suffer from 'the lack of an agreed representation -or imaginary -of a place to legitimate and validate their domicile in the island of Ireland (1997: 34) . 'Ulster', in Graham's phrase, is 'a place yet to be imagined' in a way that would culturally link people to territory (Ibid: 36). He argues that this is because of unionism's reliance on sectarian discourses, which has resulted in it being unable to confer upon Northern Ireland an agreed and inclusive representation of place. It is perhaps the absence of an imaginary homeland that allowed subsequent filmmakers to easily appropriate loyalism's image and disassociate it from its proper historical and social context, relocating loyalism to the generic cinematic landscapes of gangsterism and horror.
Generic loyalists in ceasefire cinema
The peace process that began in the 1990s might have provided the cultural environment for the inclusive and 'integrative place consciousness' that Brian
Graham argues is necessary if Northern Ireland is to achieve legitimacy and integrity gives way to a simulation of the past based on a reworking of earlier [film] representations and styles ' (2006: 207) . Mitchell from loyalism's violent attention was 'the paramilitaries' prejudice that culture was something only for "taigs and faggots"'. 4 The notion that loyalists are cultural-less may be tedious, ignoring the fact that they have access to broadly the same popular consumer culture as others and a political lexicon of their own that is rich in symbolism, narrative and ritual. But the accusation highlights another aspect of loyalism's image problem: the perception that it stands apart from and contributes nothing to the broader cultural life beyond its own narrow constituency.
Loyalists in entrepreneurial Northern

Conclusion
Loyalism needs to be the subject of a politically informed cinema and it needs to be a participant in a critically engaged film culture if it is to challenge and change its lamentable image and reputation on-screen. In short, if loyalism feels it has been misrepresented and misplaced in the films made by others then the obvious solution is for loyalists to make their own! Yet that is a lot to ask of a community that is economically straitened and, as the quote at the top of this chapter suggests, lacks the confidence to articulate itself through anything other than its own exclusive idioms. However there are ways and means and precedents. Celtic cinema'. He argues that 'the more your films are consciously aimed at an international market, the more their conditions of intelligibility will be bound up with regressive discourses about your own culture ' (1994: 119-120) . Alternatively, lowbudget filmmaking has the potential to free filmmakers from the commercial imperatives that can lead to short-hand generalisations and lazy stereotypes. 'the films were low-budget not just for economic reasons, but in order to be able to say things which remained unsaid in more orthodox structures and practices' (Ibid).
Similarly Third Cinema, a film movement with its roots in 1960s Latin America, also attempts to 'speak a socially pertinent discourse' that articulates a set of aspirations that dominant mainstream cinema excludes or marginalises (Willemen, 1994: 184) .
Paul Willemen highlights how Third Cinema's pioneers advocated an intellectual cinema; a cinema that was aesthetically non-prescriptive; a cinema that while conditioned and tailored by its own social situation was not limited to Latin America in its appeal; and above all a cinema committed to social transformation (1994: 179 -182) . This is film as a critical cultural practice, aesthetically strategic and conscious of the social processes and context of its production.
For many the idea of loyalism's association with Third Cinema or a 'poor Celtic cinema' will seem incongruous given its historical defence of monarchy and imperial power. Indeed its attempts to appropriate the language of the oppressed have been treated with incredulity and have, at times, looked absurd. Yet no community is impervious to change and transformation, and the 'double transition' that Northern
Ireland is undergoing at the moment demands a response from working class Protestants whose economic status has been undermined and whose political place seems uncertain. So far loyalism has mobilized in defence of its residual cultural forms -parades, flags and emblems. These are important to a community that feels beleaguered and excluded from social life, but surely what is called for are emergent critical cultural practices, one of which is potentially film. That cultural practice must be neither myopic in its attention to local culture and tradition nor 'evasively cosmopolitan' (Willemen, 1994: 177) ; and it must also coherently engage with
